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Abstract
According to the catastrophic health expenditure methodology a house-
hold is in catastrophe if its health out-of-pocket budget share exceeds a
critical threshold. We develop a conceptual framework for addressing three
questions in relation to this methodology, namely: 1. Can a budget share
be informative about the sign of a change in welfare? 2. Is there a positive
association between a households poverty shortfall and its health out-of-
pocket budget share? 3. Does an increase in coverage of a health insurance
scheme always result in a reduction of the prevalence of catastrophic ex-
penditures?
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1. Introduction
Risk averse individuals will appeal to insurance mechanisms as a means of diversi-
fying their risks. This diversication of risk is important and takes on many forms,
institutional and informal. In developing countries such as India, Townsend (1995)
nds that via informal mechanisms individuals are able to absorb some health re-
lated risks. However, for more serious and chronic illnesses, Gertler and Gruber
(2002) nd that health shocks can have a major impact on consumption and can
severely disrupt household welfare. There is similar evidence about the e¤ect of
health shocks in relation to developed countries such as the United States where
health insurance until recently was not mandatory. There, it has been documented
(cf. Feenberg and Skinner, 1994; Waters et al., 2004) that illness can cause house-
holds to reallocate substantial shares of their spending to out-of-pocket (OOP)
health expenditures.
Thus it has been proposed to ascribe to a situation where health OOP expendi-
tures exceed a critical share of the households total outlay the state of catastrophic
health expenditure (Xu et al 2003; Wagsta¤ and van Doorslaer 2003). There is
no exact consensus about the critical threshold level. Some studies choose values
of 5% (Berki, 1986), 10% (Waters et al., 2004) and up to 40% of non-subsistence
spending (Xu et al., 2003).
In this growing literature, the measurement of catastrophic health care pay-
ments appears to serve three main objectives surveyed below: (i) to identify
changes in levels of well-being, (ii) to assess the extent of poverty / low levels
of living at the household level and (iii) to assess the performance of existing
health insurance schemes. There is empirical evidence regarding each of these is-
sues, though an economic conceptual framework appears to be missing. Our aim
is to try to ll this gap in the literature, by attempting to provide satisfactory
answers to the following three questions:
1. Can a budget share be informative about the sign of a change in welfare?
2. Is there a positive association between a households poverty shortfall (the
di¤erence between the households income and the poverty line) and its health
out-of-pocket budget share?
3. Does an increase in coverage of a health insurance scheme always result in
a reduction of the prevalence of catastrophic expenditures?
The plan of the paper is the following. Section 2 surveys the literature in
relation to the three questions stated above. The following three sections deal with
each of questions 1 to 3. The nal section contains a summary and concluding
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comments.
2. What does catastrophic expenditure aim to measure?
To date, we can distinguish three major purposes in relation to the measure-
ment of catastrophic health expenditure. First, interest in the measurement of
catastrophic health payments stems from the fact that in the absence of health
insurance, high expenditures on health care can severely disrupt household living
standards. For instance Berki (1986) states that An expenditure for medical
care becomes nancially catastrophic when it endangers the familys ability to
maintain its customary standard of living. Ideally, this change in welfare would
be assessed with longitudinal data through examination of how health shocks
disrupt consumption paths (Gertler and Gruber, 2002). In the absence of longi-
tudinal data, OOP health payments in excess of a threshold budget share have
been used as a proxy for severe disruptions to household living standards. Re-
garding this point, Van Doorslaer et al. (2007) write We focus on payments that
are catastrophic in the sense of severely disrupting household living standards,
and approximate such payments by those absorbing a large fraction of household
resources. Thus it may be argued that a catastrophic situation may be used to
capture a change in household welfare.
Second, our reading of the literature suggests an implicit association between
the state of poverty and the state of health catastrophic expenditure. In the eco-
nomic literature on poverty, one distinguishes an ethical approach from a levels
of living approach (Atkinson, 1987). In the former, an ethical position is used
to argue that every member of society should be entitled to a minimum level of
resources. In the levels of living approach, poverty is associated with insu¢ cient
consumption resulting in a low level of welfare. We nd parallels to these two
approaches in the health payments literature. In presenting the methodology on
the measurement of catastrophic expenditure, Wagsta¤ and Van Doorslaer (2003)
write The ethical position is that no one ought to spend more than a given
fraction of income on health care 1. There are also authors who suggest that
catastrophic health expenditures are associated with low levels of living. Refer-
ring to the costs of health services, Xu et al (2003) write However accessing these
1The authors also propose measures of catastrophic expenditure drawing on similar tools as
in the poverty literature. This leads to By analogy with the poverty literature, one could dene
not just a catastrophic payment headcount but also a measure analogous to the poverty gap,
which we call the catastrophic payment gap.
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services can lead to individuals having to pay catastrophic proportions of their
available income and push many households into poverty. More explicitly, in
dening the medical poverty trap, Whitehead et al. (2001) state that Rises in
OOP costs for public and private health-care services are driving many families
into poverty, and are increasing the poverty of those who are already poor.Finally,
Flores et al. (2008) examine how households nance OOP payments (the problem
of coping with health care costs) and the implications of coping strategies for the
measurement of poverty. Clearly, in order to understand the overall relation be-
tween the incidence of poverty and catastrophic expenditure one needs to explore,
at the micro-level, the relation between the Engel curve for health OOPs and the
poverty shortfall 2. This is what we set out to do in Section 4 below.
Catastrophic health care payments are also used to measure the performance
of prevailing health insurance schemes. The understanding is that a large fraction
of individuals experiencing catastrophic health payments is associated with an in-
su¢ cient coverage in relation to health insurance contracts. According to Waters
et al. (2004), One rationale for health insurance coverage is to provide nancial
protection against catastrophic health expenditures.By insu¢ cient coverage re-
searchers often refer to the small percentage of the population in benet of any
health insurance scheme (Scheil-Adlung et al., 2006). But it may equally refer to
the lack of generosity of the health insurance scheme, with respect to copayments
(Gertler and Gruber, 2002.) A Mexican study (Knaul et al. 2006) concludes
that the prevalence of health catastrophic expenditure is reduced by an increased
coverage of the population by health insurance schemes. Likewise a joint ILO,
WHO and OECD study covering three developing countries (Scheil-Adlung et al.,
2006) nds that membership in health insurance schemes contributes to reducing
the probability of incurring catastrophic health expenditures. Nonetheless this
study shows that the protective e¤ect of being insured is not general: in South
Africa it only concerns the richest quintile of the population who is able to af-
ford more comprehensive packages (Lamiraud et al., 2005). The U.S. study of
Waters et al. (2004) also reveals that low income and the occurrence of multiple
chronic conditions, alongside the lack of health insurance, increase the probability
of catastrophic health payments.
In the sections below we develop an economic framework for addressing the
questions stated in the Introduction in relation to this literature. We begin with
asking to what extent a budget share can be informative about a change in welfare.
2Throughout the paper, we refer to the Engel curve as being the cross-sectional relation
between household income and the budget share allocated to a specic good.
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3. Catastrophic expenditure: a measure of change in wel-
fare?
When panel data on a households consumption are not available, it has been
suggested to proxy disruptions in household welfare via the use of the level of
the budget share of health OOP expenditure. Our rst question, formulated in
general terms therefore is: can a budget share be informative about the direction
of a change in household welfare?
We examine this question from two di¤erent perspectives. Firstly, at a general
level, we assume the consumers utility function does not explicitly depend on
health, but health matters to consumption decisions to the extent that health
shocks translate into income shocks. Thus, this analysis examines at the most
general level the e¤ect of an income shock on the budget share of some arbitrary
good. Then, we turn things around, by considering a specic problem where
preferences are function of an exogenous health parameter, and the consumer
maximizes utility by choice of a consumption good and a health input. In this
second perspective, we assume income stays constant before and after changes in
the exogenous health parameter and we examine the e¤ect of the health shock on
the demand for the health input.
3.1. Income shocks
We consider the following problem: by choice of quantities q1 and q2 of two goods,
a household maximizes its utility u(q1; q2)3 subject to a budget constraint p1q1 +
p2q2 = m: We let  denote the Lagrange multiplier, p
:
= [p1; p2]; and we denote
the consumers indirect utility function by v(m; p): In this conceptual framework,
a change in welfare arises from either a change in household income m; a change
in one or more prices, or nally a change in prices and income. The literature
most often focuses on income shocks as a source of welfare disruptions, since these
are household specic, whereas changes in prices are often perceived to a¤ect all
individuals alike.
Let m0 denote the households base period income, and let m1 denote the
households current period income. Consider then an income change m := m0 
m1 (which need not be a negative quantity). Approximating the resulting change
in welfare using a rst-order Taylor approximation, we have:
3The results below easily generalize in the context of n > 2 goods.
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v(m0; p) ' v(m1; p) + @v
@m
(m1; p) [m0  m1] (3.1)
From the envelope theorem we have that @v
@m
(m1; p) =  > 0; since the marginal
utility of income is always positive. Letting v := v(m0; p)   v(m1; p); we can
write (3.1) in a more compact fashion as
v = m (3.2)
Since the marginal utility of income  is a positive quantity, we can state the
following preliminary result:
Lemma 1.1 The change in welfare v is always of the same sign as the change
in income m:
Let wi
:
= piqi=m1 denote the budget share for good i in the current period.
Our next purpose is to write (3.1) in terms of wi: We rst use Roys identity to
write the marginal utility of income as :
 =  @v=@pi
qi
(3.3)
and since qi = wim1=pi; we have that
 =  pi@v=@pi
wim1
(3.4)
Replacing (3.4) in (3.2) we have that
v =  pi@v=@pi
wim1
m (3.5)
Observe that @v=@pi < 0 (the indirect utility function is decreasing in prices), so
that, as stated in the Lemma, v > 0 if and only if m > 0: Finally, rearranging
terms, we obtain the desired relation between the budget share wi and the welfare
change v :
wi =  pi@v=@pi
m1
m
v
(3.6)
Because v has the same sign as m, a high level of the budget share wi is
equally compatible with a scenario where v  0 (for which m  0) and with
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a situation such that v > 0 (corresponding to a m > 0). Accordingly, the
answer to our rst question is the following:
Proposition 1 Without additional information about the sign of the income
change, the level of a budget share cannot be informative about the sign of the
change in welfare:
The scope therefore for identifying households who experience a severe decline
in their levels of living using a budget share is limited, unless the data analyst is
sure that the household has experienced an income drop. Such information about
changes in income is however not always available in cross-section type household
surveys. The main problem is that it is hoped to identify a change in a variable
(household welfare) by means of another variable (a budget share) measured in
levels.
3.2. Health shocks
Given the above general result, we may wish to consider a more specic problem
that is implicit in much of the health economics literature. LetN denote health in-
puts and let s denote an exogenous health endowment. HealthH is produced from
these two variables via a health production function H(N; s) and the household
is assumed to maximize by choice of N a utility function u

m  pNN
pc
; H(N; s)

where (m   pNN)=pC is the remaining outlay available for spending on a an ag-
gregate consumption good C (cf. for instance Koc, 2004). Our question in this
narrower context is the following: does an exogenous health shock, signifying a
reduction in s; necessarily entail a rise in the demand for health inputs, and thus
other things equal, a rise in the relevant budget share?
To answer the above question we rst examine the rst and second order
conditions of the above problem and then turn to comparative statics. Firstly,
the rst order necessary condition for an optimum choice of N;  (N ;m; pN ; s)
:
=
@u=@N;entails a level N^ such that  (N^ ;m; pN ; s) = 0 :
 (N ;m; pN ; s) =  pN
pC
u1 + u2H1 = 0 (3.7)
where ui and Hj are rst derivatives of u(:; ) and H(:; :) with respect to their ith
and jth arguments. Di¤erentiating (3.7) again, we have
@ 
@N
=

pN
pC
2
u11   2pN
pC
u12H1 + u22H
2
1 + u2H11 (3.8)
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The rst order condition (3.7) at a point N^ is thus su¢ cient under the usual
assumptions that the marginal utility of income and health are both positive and
decreasing, that the marginal product of health inputs is positive and decreasing;
and additionally that u12  0. We gather these assumptions about preferences
and the health production functions under [A1  A2] below:
[A1] u1; u2 > 0; u11; u22  0 and u12  0 for all C;N > 0.
[A2] H1; H2 > 0 and H11  0 for all N > 0
Let v(m; pC ; pN ; s) denote the households indirect utility function. Then the
e¤ect of a health shock (an exogenous change in s) on household welfare is given
by
@v
@s
=

 pN
pC
u1 + u2

@N
@s
jN^ + u2H2jN^ (3.9)
The rst right hand side of (3.9) is zero from the envelope theorem. Accordingly,
u2H2jN^ > 0 entails that welfare increases with health. Thus, a health shock results
in a welfare deterioration under the above assumptions [A1 A2]: Following Koç
(2004), we use the implicit function theorem to obtain
@N
@s
=
 @ =@s
@ =@N
: Thus,
given assumptions [A1   A2]; @ =@N < 0 and accordingly @N=@s will be of the
same sign as @ =@s: The latter is of the form
@ 
@s
=  pN
pC
u12H2 + u22H1H2 + u2H12 (3.10)
The demand for health inputs, and accordingly the health budget share, rises as a
consequence of a health shock (@N=@s < 0) when the above derivative in (3.10) is
negative. While the rst and second right hand side terms of (3.10) are negative
under assumptions [A1  A2], the overall e¤ect is ambiguous when H12 > 0:
It is most plausible to assume H12 > 0; meaning that the marginal product
of health inputs is higher for those in better health. Under H12 = 0; the mar-
ginal product of health inputs is not a¤ected by health shocks, while H12 < 0 is
synonym to assuming that the marginal product of health inputs is lower for indi-
viduals enjoying a higher exogenous health endowment s. Though the additional
restriction H12 < 0 would entail that N rises as a consequence of a health shock,
this assumption is rarely made, as it is runs counter to common sense (Koç, 2004.)
We summarize our discussion with the following corollary to Proposition 1:
Corollary 1.2 Let the household maximize by choice of N a utility function
u

m  pNN
pc
; H(N; s)

which satises assumptions [A1-A2]. Then:
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(i) If H12  0; the budget share for health inputs always rises in response to a
welfare deterioration arising from an exogenous health shock.
(ii) If H12 > 0; a welfare deterioration arising from an exogenous health shock
has an undetermined e¤ect on the budget share for health inputs.
To conclude then, if it is taken that H12 > 0 there is again limited scope for
equating catastrophic levels of out of pocket spending with welfare disruptions
arising from health shocks. This result arises because it cannot be ruled out that
the demand for health inputs may fall as a result of a deterioration in s:
4. Catastrophic expenditure and poverty
We now turn to our second question, where we investigate the household level
relation between the poverty shortfall, the di¤erence between a households re-
sources and the poverty line, and the budget share for health OOPs. Our purpose
here is to inquire as to the existence of a positive association between these two
variables. The answer to this question would appear to be straightforward if we
were willing to assume the existence of a decreasing Engel curve relation between
the health budget share and income. With this assumption we could certainly
conclude that catastrophic expenditure rises with poverty and thus we could ar-
gue that to the extent that economic development reduces poverty, it would also
reduce the incidence of catastrophic expenditure.
However, the assumption of a decreasing Engel curve, or more specically of
a monotonic Engel curve is not as natural as it seems. Modern empirical research
as well as economic theory of consumer choice highlights the importance of non-
linearities in the Engel curve relation. Stated di¤erently, economic theory does
not rule out that a good could be a necessity at some income intervals and a
luxury at others. This is where we begin our investigation of our second question.
Let z denote the poverty line and dene (m; z) as a households poverty
shortfall from the poverty line 4. Because poverty measures respect the Pareto
principle (see Atkinson, 1987) the function (m; z) is monotonically decreasing in
m; for m < z and is further assumed to be zero for m  z: The function (m; z)
is thus invertible and we dene
m $ h(; z) (4.1)
4That is, a poverty measure P (m; z) relates to the sum of individual family level poverty
shortfalls via the identity P (m; z) :=
R z
0
(m; z)dF; where F (m) is the distribution of income.
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to be the resulting inverse function. We also write the general Engel curve relation
for health OOP as w $  (m); where we observe once again that this relation need-
not be monotonic.
Substituting for m in the Engel curve relation using (4.1), we have
w =  [h(; z)] (4.2)
Accordingly, in the region  > 0 we have 5
dw
d
=
d 
dh
@h
@
(4.3)
Because m = h(; z) is decreasing in ; the second right-hand-term is non-
positive and it follows that in (;w) space the function (4.2) will indeed have a
positive slope for all  > 0 provided the Engel curve relation  (m) is monotoni-
cally decreasing at all income levels. In such a situation, it is the case that for any
budget share threshold dening the state of catastrophic expenditure, increases
in income will simultaneously result in a decline in the intensity of catastrophic
expenditure and poverty.
Now consider a situation where the Engel curve is non-monotonic. The simple
relation (4.3) informs us that the non-linearities in the Engel curve will be depicted
by the function (4.2). To illustrate our point, we may borrow the specication
of quadratic logarithmic demands from Banks et al. (1997) 6: In a cross-section
environment where prices are taken to be constant, the resulting budget share
relation is of the form
w(m) = 0 + 1 lnm+ 2(lnm)
2 (4.4)
where 1 and 2 are coe¢ cients that may be of opposite or identical signs. More
specically, when 1 and 2 are of opposite signs the resulting Engel curve can
be increasing over some income interval and decreasing over another range of
5At  = 0; the function h(; z) rises to innity, and accordingly the derivative
@h
@
is no
longer dened.
6The budget shares underlying quadratic logarithmic demands are of the form
w(m; p)
:
= 0(p) + 1(p)[lnm  ln a(p)] + 2(p)[lnm  ln a(p)]2
where each of the functions 1 and 2 may either be both positive or negative over the price
space. If we abstract from price variations across family units, the resulting function w(m) is of
the form (4.4).
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incomes. For the individual poverty shortfall function consider the simple speci-
cation based on Watts (1968):
(m; z) $ log(z=m) m < z (4.5)
(m; z) $ 0 m  z
The resulting relation between  and w is given by
w = 0 + 1 ln z + 2(ln z)
2   [1 + 22 ln z] + 22 (4.6)
Preliminary research by Lamiraud and Abul Naga (2006) using South African
data suggests that the Engel curve for health OOP is U shaped: Accordingly, in
Figure 1 we plot a hypothetical situation where we set 0 = 0:40; 1 =  0:80 and
2 = 0:50:We also set the poverty line at z = 4:5; and consider a range of income
values in the interval m 2 [1; 4] pertaining to individuals experiencing poverty.
The NorthEast quadrant plots the Engel curve relation which, given the para-
meter values, is U shaped, and reaches its minimum at m = exp(0:80) = 2:23:
The SouthEast quadrant plots the relation (4.5) between income and the poverty
shortfall. To obtain the relation between  and w; we draw a 45o degree line
in the SouthWest quadrant of the diagram. Finally, in the NorthWest quadrant
we obtain the desired relation (4.6). The graph illustrates in a simple fashion
(4.3), that is, the fact that the relation between w and  will reect the curvature
properties of the Engel curve.
Algebraically, the relation drawn in the NorthWest quadrant, given our choice
of functional forms and parameter values, is readily obtained from (4.6) as w =
0:33   0:7 + 0:52 such that the curve reaches its minimum at  = 0:7: The
example may also illustrate one common policy concern. When societys primary
objective is the alleviation of catastrophic expenditure at very low income levels
(say m < m), then, in the example, this is the segment of the distribution of
income where there is a positive association between the poverty shortfall and the
budget share.
As an answer to our second question, the preceding discussion is summarized
by means of the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (a) Let the Engel curve for health out-of-pocket expenditure be
a non-monotonic function of income below the poverty line. Then the resulting
relation between the budget share and the poverty shortfall is also non-monotonic.
(b) A su¢ cient condition to obtain a positive association between the budget
share and the poverty shortfall is that the Engel curve for health OOP be a de-
creasing function of income below the poverty line.
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It is therefore an empirical question to ask as to whether the Engel curve
for OOP health expenditures is indeed a declining function of income so as to
guarantee a positive association between poverty and catastrophic expenditure at
the economy-wide level.
5. Catastrophic expenditure: a measure of performance of
health insurance systems?
As discussed in Section 2, it has been advocated that the intensity of catastrophic
health care payments may be used as an index of the performance (i.e. under-
coverage) of prevailing health insurance schemes. In this section therefore we
construct a simple model for the demand of health in the developing country con-
text in order to address our third question, namely: Does an increase in coverage
of a health insurance scheme always result in a reduction of the prevalence of
catastrophic expenditures? As simple as it is, the model will serve to highlight
some weaknesses in the pursuit of minimizing catastrophic expenditure as a public
policy objective.
Assume the exogenous health endowment s is a random variable, and individ-
uals can insure themselves against the adverse health states. Our starting point
is a situation whereby a hypothetical population is in benet of a compulsory
health insurance, o¤ering a co-insurance 0    1 to individuals, in exchange
for a premium (): The function (:) is decreasing, with (0) = K > 0 and
(1) = 0: The parameter  is chosen by the government, and  = 0 corresponds
to a situation of full insurance, while  = 1; is the opposite case where there is no
insurance coverage 7.
Returning to the framework of Section 3, we dene the individuals preferences
over two goods; a consumption aggregate denoted C and a health input denoted
N: We allow the individual to opt for a corner solution N = 0; as there exists
empirical evidence documenting cases where insured individuals in poor health
forego health-care at low income levels 8. We normalize the price of health in-
puts such that pN = 1: Under such circumstances, the consumers out of pocket
expenditure is simply N: The households constraints take the form of a budget
7In the U.S. and many developing countries the consumer has the decision to insure or to
opt out of the insurance scheme. Such considerations are examined in Abul Naga and Lamiraud
(2008). The results and conclusions presented here are qualitatively similar to those of Abul
Naga and Lamiraud (2008) where the consumer endogenously chooses whether or not to insure.
8See in particular Lamiraud et al. (2005).
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constraint as well as a non-negativity constraint on N :
pCC + N = m  () (5.1)
N  0 (5.2)
Within the class of utility functions which comply by assumptions [A1   A2] we
shall choose a quasi-linear specication of the form
u[C;H(N; s)] =  logC +H (5.3)
and a health production function
H(N; s) = G(s)N +B(s) (5.4)
where G(s) and B(s) are increasing functions of s: B(s) is the individuals health
H(0; s) when N = 0; whereas G(s) is the marginal product of the health input.
The specication is relevant in the developing country context, since (5.3) entails
that individuals initially allocate their spending to the consumption good, and
upon reaching a certain threshold, start consuming the health good N . For (5.3
5.4) to satisfy assumptions [A1   A2] of Section 3 we further require  > 0;
G0(s); B0(s) > 0 and G00(s); B00(s) < 0:
The optimum level of spending on the health input is obtained as the solution
of the following constrained optimization problem:
max
C;N
L(C;N; 1; 2; s)
:
=  log(C) + Es [G(s)N +B(s)] +
+1[m  ()  pCC   N ] + 2N (5.5)
where Es(:) is the expectations operator with respect to the distribution of s; 1 is
a Lagrange multiplier and 2 is a Kuhn-Tuker multiplier. The optimum level of
out of pocket expenditures obeys the simple rule:
 bN = 0 m  ~m() (5.6)
 bN = m  ~m() m > ~m() (5.7)
where ~m() is the critical income threshold below which households allocate their
entire expenditure to the consumption good:
~m()
:
= () + =Es[G(s)] (5.8)
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The Engel curve for out of pocket expenditures is obtained as the ratio of
(5.6-5.7) to the households income net of the health insurance premium:
wN(m;) = 0 m  ~m() (5.9)
wN(m;) =

m  ~m()
m  ()

m > ~m() (5.10)
Given a critical budget share threshold ! 2 [0; 1]; households for which wN > !
are dened to be in a state of catastrophic expenditure. The question we turn to
below is whether when  falls from an initial value 0 to a new value 1 < 0 it
is always the case that the incidence of catastrophic expenditure declines.
Di¤erentiating (5.8) with respect to ; we have
dem
d
= 0() + =Es[G(s)] (5.11)
The rst right hand side term above is negative (the premium falls as the co-
payment rate rises) 9, while the second is positive. The overall e¤ect of a rise in
 on the critical income is therefore ambiguous.
Below we distinguish two cases for the relation between  and the change in
catastrophic expenditure, depending on whether the derivative of (5.11) is positive
or negative.
5.1. Case 1 model: ~m(1) < ~m(0)
Assume rst that for 1 < 0 the resulting e¤ect is that the critical income at
which households begin to incure positive OOPs also declines: ~m(1) < ~m(0):
Then, at any income m  ~m(1) the new Engel curve wN(m;1) lies everywhere
above the initial Engel curve wN(m;1)10: This is illustrated in Figure 2.
That is; while there is an increase in coverage of the health insurance scheme,
in the sense that a larger share of health expenditures is taken on by the insurer,
the incidence of catastrophic expenditure is increased. The Case 1 model therefore
provides a counter-example to the hypothesis that catastrophic expenditures are
associated with an insu¢ cient coverage of a given health insurance scheme.
9While it is always the case that 0() < 0; the curvature (i.e. second derivative) properties
of () depend amongst other things on the distribution of income, and whether the insurance
premium is fair. See Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) for further discussion.
10See the rst part of Proposition 4 in the appendix for a proof of this statement.
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On the positive side, it is to be noted that when the critical income falls,
there is an additional share of the population (individuals with incomes in the
interval ~m(1)  m  ~m(0)) who are consuming health inputs. If the proba-
bility of morbidity decreases with the consumption of health inputs, then in this
Case, catastrophic expenditure rises but potential morbidity falls when there is
an increase in insurance coverage. As such, one lesson to learn from this Case
1 model is the importance of making explicit the means by which catastrophic
expenditure is to be reduced, or yet to keep in mind that population health may
actually improve when the incidence of catastrophic expenditure rises.
5.2. Case 2 model: ~m(1)  ~m(0)
Next, consider the case whereby for 1 < 0 the critical income at which house-
holds begin to incure positive OOPs rises: ~m(1)  ~m(0): Then, at the new
critical income ~m(1) we have that wN( ~m(1);0) > 0 while wN( ~m(1);1) = 0:
That is, the new Engel curve lies initially below the former curve wN(m;0): In
Proposition 4 of the Appendix we show that there can be at most one crossing of
the two Engel curves over the interval m  ~m(1):
Let us consider in turn these two possible scenarios. First, consider the situa-
tion where the two Engel curves do not cross at any income levelm > ~m(0): Then,
in contrast with the Case 1 model, when the critical income rises, catastrophic
expenditure is reduced and there is an additional share of the population (indi-
viduals with incomes in the interval ~m(0)  m  ~m(1)) who are no longer
consuming health inputs.
Next, consider a scenario such that the two Engel curves intersect at some
nite income t 2 [ ~m(1);1). This is illustrated in Figure 3. Individuals with
resources m < t are allocating smaller shares of their resources to health OOPs
whereas those with resources m > t are allocating larger shares. The overall
e¤ect of a change in  on the incidence of catastrophic expenditure depends on
the value at which the critical threshold ! is set in relation to wN(t; 1): Let
F (m) denote again the cumulative distribution of income, and assume rst that
!  wN(t; 1): Then there exist incomes ma and mb; with ma > mb; such that
wN(ma; 1) = wN(mb; 0) = !: Catastrophic expenditure under the new scheme
is 1   F (ma); which is less than the former level of catastrophic expenditure
1  F (mb):
Conversely, if ! > wN(t; 1) the new scheme will now entail a larger share
of the population experiencing catastrophic expenditure (see Figure 3). Here the
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incomes ma and mb that satisfy wN(ma; 1) = wN(mb; 0) = ! are such that
ma < mb ; so that now 1  F (ma)  1  F (mb).
Thus, in the Case 2 model, the e¤ect of adopting a more generous insurance
package has an undetermined e¤ect on the incidence of catastrophic health ex-
penditure: if the two Engel curves fail to cross, then clearly the incidence of
catastrophic expenditure will be reduced. In the alternative case, a crossing of
the Engel curves entails that there exist values of the critical threshold ! that will
produce a rise in the incidence of catastrophic expenditure.
5.3. Change in coverage: overall e¤ect
The Case I model, where the critical income falls, entails that the incidence of
catastrophic expenditure is on the rise when population coverage of the health
insurance scheme increases via a reduction in the copayment rate . In the Case
II model the overall e¤ect of a change in population coverage on the incidence of
catastrophic expenditure is ambiguous. If a crossing of Engel curves occurs, then
there is a range of critical thresholds ! which entail a reduction in the incidence
of catastrophic expenditures, and there is also a range of critical thresholds which
entails a rise in the incidence of catastrophic expenditures. We may summarize
our above discussion with the following Proposition:
Proposition 3 (a) Under the case I model ( ~m(1) < ~m(0)), a reduction in
the copayment rate results in an increase in the incidence of catastrophic expen-
diture.
(b) Under the case II model ( ~m(1)  ~m(0)), a reduction in copayment rate
results in: (1) a reduction of the incidence of catastrophic expenditures provided the
two Engel curves wN(m;0) and wN(m;1) do not cross for all values m  ~m(0);
(2) has an undetermined e¤ect on the incidence of catastrophic expenditure if the
two Engel curves wN(m;0) and wN(m;1) cross at some nite income level
t > ~m(1):
6. Concluding comments
We may summarize our answers to the three questions raised in the paper as
follows:
1. An observed budget share level for a given good is compatible with both
a drop or a rise in levels of living. Thus, without additional information about
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the direction of income change, the level of a budget share cannot be informative
about the sign of the change in welfare.
2. In the general case where below the poverty line the Engel curve for OOPs
is a non-monotonic function of income, the resulting relation between the budget
share and the poverty shortfall is also non-monotonic. However, if below the
poverty line the income elasticity for OOPs is smaller than one (i.e. the Engel
curve is decreasing), this will indeed entail a positive association between the
poverty shortfall and the budget share for health OOPs.
3. An increase in coverage of a health insurance scheme need not always result
in a reduction of the prevalence of catastrophic expenditures.
In relation to our rst question, we may conclude therefore that the scope for
using cross-section data to identify households who experience a severe decline
in their levels of living using a budget share is considerably limited, unless the
data analyst is sure that the household has experienced an income drop. Such
information about changes in income is readily available from panel data, but is
rarely encountered in cross-section type household surveys.
We note from our discussion in relation to the second question that we have
addressed in the paper, that it does not follow that catastrophic health expendi-
ture increases with poverty. Empirical work is therefore needed in order to further
explore the curvature properties of the Engel curve for health care spending.
Finally, with the help of a simple model, we have shown that catastrophic
expenditure could well increase when the share of health payments covered by a
health insurance scheme is increased. Also, one lesson we retain from this analysis
is the importance of making explicit the means by which catastrophic expenditure
is to be reduced, since it is quite conceivable that population health may actually
improve when the incidence of catastrophic expenditure rises. Thus, more work
is needed in order to better understand how the overall performance of a health
insurance scheme relates to the incidence of catastrophic expenditures, and more
generally, to population health.
7. Appendix
In this appendix we study the intersection of the two Engel curves before and
after a change in ; the co-insurance rate.
Dene the function wN : [ ~m(1);1) ! [ 1; 1] as the di¤erence in Engel
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curves for out of pockets:
wN(m)
:
=

m  ~m(1)
m  (1)

 

m  ~m(0)
m  (0)

(7.1)
Let NUM1(m) := m  ~m(1); DENOM1 (m) := m  (1); respectively denote
the numerator and denominator of the rst left-hand term of (a1). Likewise dene
NUM2(m)
:
= m   ~m(0); DENOM2 (m) := m   (0): We have the following
result:
Proposition 4 :
(i) For 1 < 0 let ~m(1) < ~m(0): Then wN(m) > 0 everywhere on its
domain [ ~m(1);1):
(ii) For 1 < 0 let ~m(1) > ~m(0): Then there exists at most one nite
income t 2 [ ~m(1);1) such that wN(t) = 0.
Proof : (i) Since (1) > (0) and from the assumption underlying Case A,
namely, ~m(1) < ~m(0); we have the joint inequalities NUM1(m) > NUM2(m)
and DENOM1(m) < DENOM2(m): Thus, in (a1) the rst RHS ratio is always
greater than the second RHS ratio, and accordingly wN(m) > 0 everywhere over
[ ~m(1);1]:
(ii) Here we show that there can be at most one crossing of the two Engel
curves in the interval [ ~m(1);1): Firstly observe that wN [ ~m(1)] < 0: If there
exists a point t 2 [ ~m(1);1) such that wN(t) = 0; it is a solution to
((t  (0)) ((t  ~m(1)) = ((t  (1)) ((t  ~m(0)) (a2)
Upon simplifying, this gives:
t =
(1) ~m(0)  (0) ~m(1)
(1)  (0)  ( ~m(1)  ~m(0)) (a3)
If the point t lies outside the interval [ ~m(1);1), then wN(m) is everywhere
negative and the two Engel curves do not intersect over the relevant domain of
denition 11. 
11By using the denition of ~m() in (5.8), one can verify that the denominator of (a3) is
always positive provided 1 < 0:
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Figure 1: Health OOP budget share and poverty shortfall
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Figure 2: Engel curve for OOP spending (case 1  submodel)
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Figure 3: Engel curve for OOP spending (case 2 submodel)
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